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NOTES
SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHT TO DIRECT RECOVERY
IN DERIVATIVE SUITS
Direct recovery to stockholders in a derivative action is the exception
rather than the rule. A stockholders' derivative suit is one brought for the
benefit of a corporation by one or more of its stockholders who bring the
action on behalf of stockholders as a class to enforce a corporate cause of
action which the officers and directors have failed or refused to bring.
Corporate recovery is generally grounded on the theory that the wrong
was done to the corporation, not to its stockholders either individually or
2
collectively,' and that the recovery is an asset of the corporation.
Since the topic of derivative suits involves many aspects, this paper
will be concerned only with circumstances under which direct recovery
to stockholders, rather than to the corporation, may be allowed.
Derivative suits giving rise to direct recovery most frequently involve
those situations in which the majority owners have voted themselves
excessive salaries3; have converted assets of the corporation to their own
1.

Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E.
193 (1909).

2.
3.

Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 623, 100 Atl. 645 (1917).
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use 4; have sold corporate offices or control of the corporation5 ; or have
breached their fiduciary duty in other ways, such as taking a corporate
opportunity for themselves6 or profiting from personal dealing with their
7
own corporation.
The equities involved when these various wrongs to the corporation
have been committed, result in allowance of direct recovery to the stockholders in exceptional circumstances." In such cases, each stockholder who
is to recover receives a percentage of what the total recovery to the corporation would have been, in the proportion that his stock ownership bears
to the total stock outstanding.9 The underlying theory of direct recovery
might well be summed up thusly: "Every suit in a derivative capacity necessarily includes a suit in an individual capacity as well,"'1 and "There is
something abnormal in a judgment that allows the persons who did the
fraudulent thing to share in the recovery for their guilt.""
Historically, the idea of a direct recovery appears to have evolved
from the right of stockholders to force distribution of assets of a defunct
corporation. In 1855, stockholders of a corporation whose charter had been
forfeited were successful in gaining a court order for liquidation and
distribution of the assets by the trustee' 2; then in Bailey's Appeal,13 in 1880,
minority stockholders gained an order that the majority holders who had
fraudulently liquidated the firm and acquired its assets held the assets as
trustees and must account to the minority.
The next step in the evolution of the direct recovery theory was for
the court to appoint a receiver, in proper cases, when corporations were
involved in disputes between groups of stockholders, with pro-rata distribution of assets.1 4 From there it was an easy step to the awarding of
direct recovery to stockholders even where the corporation was a going
concern and to be continued as such. Probably the first case of this type
was Eaton v. Robinson, 5 where direct recovery was ordered to make it
unnecessary for the minority to resort to another suit to compel the
defendant majority shareholders, who were also officers and directors and
who had voted themselves excessive salaries, to distribute the fund.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Dill v. Johnston, 72 Okla. 149, 179 Pac. 608 (1919).
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); Commonwealth Title & Trust
Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77 (1910).
Young v. Columbia Oil Co. of West Virginia, 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 (1931).
Spaulding v. North Milwaukee Town-Site Co., 106 Wis. 481, 81 N.W. 1064 (1900).
Von Arnim v. American Tubeworks, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E. 680 (1905); Geltman
v. Levy, 11 App. Div. 2d 411, 207 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1960).
DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N.Y.S. 912, 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d
570 (1937).
May v. Midwest Refining Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.) , cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668
(1941).
Hyde Park Terrace Co. v. Jackson Bros. Realty Co., 161 App. Div. 699, 146 N.Y.S.
1037 (1914).
Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. 480 (1855).
Bailey's Appeal, 96 Pa. 253 (1880).
Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892) ; Davis v. Gemmell,
73 Md. 530, 21 Atl. 712 (1891).
Eaton v. Robinson, 19 R.I. 146, 31 Ad. 1058 (1895) ; cf., Fougeray v. Cord, 50
N.J.Eq. 185, 24 Atd. 499 (1892); but cf., Laurel Springs Land Co. v. Fougeray,
50 N.J. Eq. 756, 26 Ad. 886 (1893).
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SITUATIONS IN WHICH DIRECT RECOVERY ALLOWED

Situations in which courts have allowed direct recovery may be
divided generally into two broad classes-those in which the corporation is
no longer a going concern or is to be liquidated,1 6 and those in which the
corporation is a going cocern and the intention is to continue it as such.
In this latter category the purpose of direct recovery is to limit recovery
to the innocent shareholders' 7 and to insure that they receive it. i s
When recovery is limited to innocent stockholders, three types of

situations are generally encountered: (1) some of the shareholders have
assented to the wrongdoers' acts or have waived their rights, and thus are
not entitled to participate in recoveryl 9 ; (2) the plaintiffs and the defendants own all of the stock, and recovery to the corporation would
merely result in defendants' reimbursing themselves to the extent of
-their stock interest 20 ; and (3) shares of the defendants have been sold to
outsiders who would then get an undeserved windfall if recovery were
2
ordered to the corporation. '
In the first broad class, in which the corporation is not a going concern or is to be liquidated, direct recovery is awarded on the reasoning
that the corporation, being dissolved, has no use for money, except for
distribution to its stockholders 2 2; no advantage can be gained by payment
to the corporation2 3 ; and payment direct to the stockholders will avoid
circuity.

24

In the second broad class, in which the corporation is -to continue as
a going concern, direct recovery as a means of insuring that the plaintiff
stockholders receive the money awarded is usually necessary where the
wrong-doing defendants control the corporation. This was the case in
Davis v. Gemmell, 25 where liquidation of the company was ordered, and
in Eaton v. Robinson supra,2 6 where the corporation was allowed to

continue. Many such cases involve situations in which there are only 27a
few stockholders, the majority have voted themselves excessive salaries,
and remain in control of the firm. The effect of direct recovery is actually
a court declaration of a dividend, 28 and while it can be argued that this
is a sequestration of corporate property, 29 courts have met this with the
contention that to pay the money back to the corporation would be to
note 7.
v. DeYoung, 167 11. 549, 47 N.E. 863 (1897).
v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357 (Minn. 1927).
v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 189 At. 320 (1937).

16.
17.
18.
19.

Supra
Brown
Backus
Bailey

20.

Crichton v. Webb Press Co., Ltd., 113 La. 167, 36 So. 926, 67 L.R.A. 76, 104
Am. Rep. 500 (1904).
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
Supra note 7.
Sale v. Ambler, 335 Pa. 165, 6 A.2d 519 (1939).
Shanik v. Empire Power Corp., 58 N.Y.S.2d 176, alf'd, 296 N.Y. 664, 69 N.E.2d
818 (1945).
Davis v. Gemmell, 73 Md. 530, 31 At. 712 (1891).
Supra note 15.
Supra note 17.
Baillie v. Columbia Gold Mining Co., 86 Ore. 1, 166 Pac. 965 (1917).
Supra note 15.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
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30
return it to the custody and control of those from whom recovery is had.
In limiting recovery to the innocent stockholders, courts are merely
acting to avoid placing "the undeserving upon equality with the meritorius," 3' which would be the result of the court ordered recovery to the
corporation in any of the three general situations.
In the first category, that of waiver or assent, the situation generally
involves wrongdoing by officers or directors of the corporation, with
32
acquiescence or laches by part of the stockholders and objection by others,
waiver of rights or settlement by some stockholders,3 3 or a vote by some
34
stockholders in favor of ratification and vote against ratification by others.
In such cases, it is obvious that those who acquiesced in or ratified the
wrongful acts are not deserving of participation in recovery, and only
by direct recovery can the purpose of awarding the deserving, and not the
undeserving, be achieved.
In the second category, where plaintiffs and defendants own all of
the stock, direct recovery combines the purpose of limiting recovery to the
innocent stockholders with the purpose of insuring that these innocent
stockholders receive the recovery, for here the wrong-doing defendants
are also usually in charge of the corporation. The reasoning in the early
case of Eaton v. Robinson supra,3 5 has been followed in later cases in order
to benefit only the innocent and not those who participated in the misappropriation.3 6
The third category, where corporate recovery would mean a windfall
to outsides who bought their stock from the defendants, is illustrated
by the recent case of Perlman v. Feldmann,37 which allowed direct recovery
of profits from the wrongful sale of control of the corporation, holding
,that the control was a corporate asset for which recovery could be granted.
The dominant stockholders and a former officer had sold the controlling
stock at a premium price to an end-user of the firm's product-and with
control went the right to corner distribution of this product during a
time of market shortage. The court held that the plaintiff stockholders
were entitled to recover in their own right their pro-rata share of the
amount the purchase price exceeded the market price, since the purchasers
should not share in any judgment rendered.
OTHER

FACTORS

IN ALLOWANCE

OF DIRECT

RECovERY

In awarding direct recovery, courts have not always ordered a money
payment. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert,38 Southern Pacific reorganized
a small subsidiary into a new company in which the minority stockholders
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Supra note 18.
Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 623, 100 At. 645 (1917).
Ibid.
Jenkins v. Bradley, 104 Wis. 540, 80 N.W. 1025 (1899).
Chounis v. Laing, 125 W. Va. 275, 23 S.E.2d 628 (1942) ; but cf., Keenan v. Eshelman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (1938).

35.

Supra note 15.

36.
37.

Supra note 17.
Supra note 5.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919).

38.
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received nothing. Southern Pacific was ordered to deliver to the minority
stockholders of the old company their proportionate share of stock in the
new company, plus dividends paid on the stock less an allowance for their
share of cost of reduction of the floating debt. In Samia v. Central Oil
Co.39 three brothers who controlled a family-owned corporation used its
credit to finance a corporation of their own, to which they diverted business.
Their three sisters sued for damages to the family corporation. The court
held that to require the brothers to hold the stock of the new corporation
in trust for the family corporation would "unjustly enrich the principal
wrongdoer," so instead ordered each brother to sell ten percent of his
holdings to one of his sisters. This resulted in each member of the family
holding the same interest in each corporation and dispensed with the need
for payment of damages by the new firm to the family firm. The brothers,
however, were also ordered to pay to the famliy firm the amount of expense accounts they were unable to justify and the amount of excessive
interest charges caused the family firm by their "improper conduct."
Also, courts have awarded direct recovery over the protest of the
plaintiff, either to avoid recovery to an undeserving stockholder, 40 or to
avoid granting corporate relief which would be "wholly impracticable," as
in May v. Midwest Refining Co.41 Here, Standard Oil Co. held 99.96
percent of the stock of Midwest, and at a stockholders meeting voted to
sell the assets of Midwest at book value to itself and another subsidiary.
Standard offered to pay the plaintiff his loss on the basis of his complaintplus his costs, but May wanted to void the sale on the grounds that
Standard, as majority stockholder, was in a fiduciary capacity. The court
ruled that "to attempt to grant relief by annulling this sale made six
years ago and restoring such a vast amount and diversity of property . . .
is wholly impracticable." Adding that "an eighty-million-dollar egg cannot
be unscrambled, and the expense and time involved in trying to do so
would be so great as to amount to a denial of justice," the court ordered
the direct recovery to the plaintiff, despite his protest. The recovery gave
the plaintiff some $43,000 in counsel fees and expenses, while the book
value of his stock was roughly $6,400.
Closely related to direct recovery in derivative suits is the allowance
of a direct suit by a former stockholder, who cannot now bring a derivative
suit but who has suffered a wrong while a stockholder. In one such case a
former owner of one-half the stock of the corporation was allowed to
recover, against the former owner of the other half of the stock, for misappropriation of assets prior to the sale to the present owners. 42 In another
case, a former stockholder, who complained of a breach of fiduciary
relationship by the former directors, was allowed to bring a direct suit on
39.
40.
41.
42.

Samia v. Central Oil Co. of Worcester, 339 Mass. 124, 158 N.E. 471 (1959).
Joyce v. Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 195 Pac. 29 (1921).
May v. Midwest Refining Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668
(1941).
Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956).
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grounds that the present sole stockholder bought with knowledge and
43
thus no stockholder existed who could vindicate the wrong.
In allowing direct recovery in derivative suits, courts generally will
not allow such recovery when there are any unpaid creditors, on the theory
that recovery is an asset of the corporation, and to pay that recovery
directly to stockholders leaving creditors unpaid would be fraudulent as
to them,4 4 but when no rights of creditors or of members of the general
public are involved, then direct recovery is permissible.4 5
CONCLUSION

What the attitude of the Wyoming court would be concerning the
matter of direct recovery in a derivative suit is in doubt, since it has not
yet been litigated, although there is dictum in one case 46 that the final
relief belongs to the corporation and not to the stockholders. The majority
of decisions allowing direct recovery have been handed down since that
Wyoming dictum, however; and in addition to that given by the United
States Supreme Court and several federal circuit courts, direct recovery
has been granted by state courts in Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Perlman v. Feldmann, supra,47 one of the most recent cases allowing
direct recovery, has been commented on as "making an impact on the legal
fraternity,"4s although possibly more for its corporate control aspects than
for its direct recovery allowance. Concerning the rights of the minority
49
to recover, one court commented on this case thusly:
Corporate law in general, and the status of the minority
shareholder in particular, is in a constant state of flux. New
formulae and rules giving recognition to changing concepts of
business morality and the needs of a dynamic and complex industrial society are continually being adopted by our legislatures
and courts. There can be little doubt that as ownership of American industry becomes more diverse greater rights and responsibilities will attach to the status of shareholders....
The above-quoted comment that "corporate law is in a constant state of
flux" indicates that direct recovery in derivative suits is a product not only
of the expansion of the corporate system but also of a gradual change of
law in regard to it. It would therefore seem likely that the Wyoming court
would recognize these changes should the matter come before it.
ROBERT
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

H.
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Hammer v. Werner, 239 App. Div. 38, 265 N.Y.S. 172 (1933).
Supra note 2.
Peoples State Bank v. Jacksonian Hotel Co., 261 Ky. 101, 87 S.W.2d 1111 (1935).
Smith v. Stone, 21 Wyo. 62, 128 Pac. 612 (1912).
Supra note 5.
Manacher v. Reynolds, 165 A.2d 741 (Del. Ch. 1960).
H. Y. Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co., 405 Pa. 148, 173 A.2d
319, 322 (1961).

